T HE AIM of this essay is to clarify the models of moral thinking and doing called teleology and deontology, to gain understanding of utilitarianism as a subcategory of the former, and to explore the relation both to utilitarianism and to teleology in general of certain Christian "consequentialist" modes of moral argument. This purpose arises out of a general and considerable unclarity in recent ethical literature about the relation between the conceptual tools of moral philosophy and modes of argument in moral theology. 
exist in the resolution of any moral conflict a due "proportion" between the value concretely sacrificed and the value realized by the choice. In the eyes of his critics, this amounts to a utilitarian account of moral responsibility, since it seems to suggest that any moral principle can be overridden by considerations of beneficence or even expediency. An objective of this essay is to examine the validity of such a critique and to further the development of a more systematic account of the elements of McCormick's own teleology.
DEFINING DEONTOLOGY AND TELEOLOGY
Some authors, including McCormick, have tried to account for nonutilitarian forms of teleology by calling them "mixed" teleology and deontology, 2 but this seems to entail the questionable assumption that "pure" teleology is utilitarianism and that nonutilitarian elements in moral obligation must be deontological, not teleologica! It seems more fruitful to construe teleology and deontology as distinct models of moral thinking, but not as opposed necessarily. From such a point of view, the best way to understand the elements of moral reasoning is not to divide them between two mutually exclusive models, but rather to take each model as a general and comprehensive perspective on moral agency within which all the key factors in moral obligation may be included in interrelations peculiar to that model.
The terms "teleology" and "deontology" were first paired and contrasted in 1930 by C. D. Broad, 3 though the models they represent long precede him. According to Broad, deontological theories (from the Greek deon or duty) hold that it is possible to say of an act that it "would always be right (or wrong)... no matter what its consequences might be." That is, some actions are intrinsically right or wrong and thus obligatory or forbidden, regardless of the motives for which they are performed or the the narrower theory, defining it as the view that consequences alone are morally decisive, while deontology allows more moderately that "there are other considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences "
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Thus it is evident that some disagreements about the adequacy of the models to account for moral experience may be the result of variance and perhaps misunderstanding at the level of foundational definitions. The teleologist will not accept a deontology which he or she believes absolves agents from accountability for the results of their choices; the deontologist is intolerant of a teleology which relativizes every moral principle and makes the dignity of persons subordinate to generally beneficial outcomes. However, if the two models can be construed fairly in terms of the priority (not exclusivity) they give respectively to the principle of beneficence and the principle of justice, then the inclusive or broad teleologist (following the counsel of Ross) will claim that doing good is the essence of moral obligation, but that good must be distributed fairly, and that the equality and rights of all persons must be respected. The broad deontologist will claim that duty, obligation, and equal respect for persons define moral agency, but that duty comtemplates responsibility for the consequences of one's acts. It is upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretative tradition of a teleological ethics of nature that McCormick and other Catholic authors primarily and most explicitly draw. In teleology comprehensively understood, the moral agent acts in order to bring into being, or to conform action to, certain goals, purposes, or states of affairs. Aristotle is in this sense the teleologist par excellence. To act morally is to act for the end of realizing human excellence or virtue, the human telos. Aristotle's Christian heir and interpreter, Thomas Aquinas, defines moral acts in terms of their consistency with what is "natural" to humans as their end or purpose, i.e., to act reasonably and freely, to know the truth and do what is good. Both Aristotle and Aquinas construe human agency as essentially purposive and gauge it by the attainment of its appropriate goals.
The "good" in these prototypical teleologies is perhaps best defined as that in which consists human happiness; however, it is not pleasure in any hedonic sense, nor is it quantifiable, nor limited in its potential range of distribution to some, entailing the exclusion of others. In this it is distinct from "the good" as defined by utilitarianism, a form of teleological ethics which has absorbed much philosophical attention in the twentieth century. 9 The confusion between Aristotelian-Thomistic teleology as interpreted by McCormick and others, and utilitarian models for the consideration of consequences, is a problem in need of attention if the conversation about the merits and shortcomings of a Christian form of "consequentialism" is to progress.
The modern fathers of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and James Stuart Mill (1806-73) define the good in terms of social welfare. Acts are obligatory if they meet the test of the principle of utility, that is, if they maximize the happiness of a larger number of people than would alternative courses of action. The good is happiness, and happiness is pleasure and absence of pain (both physical and intellectual or emotional). Despite disputes over whether the quantity only or the quality also of pleasure is to count, and whether the happiness in question is the sum total or average, utilitarian theories decidedly represent a shift in the meaning of telos, and, indeed, of happiness. For Bentham and Mill, the telos is most adequately defined as "net social good," and it is conceivable that the participation of a minority may be precluded by the welfare of the majority. As Mill remarks in Utilitarianism (1861), the principle of justice has no meaning if considered independently of the principle of utility. Justice means exactly expediency. "All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse."
10 Now some utilitarians cope with criticisms of the system by allowing that respect for the minimal rights of each will in the long run be in the general interest, or 9 In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle sees certain material conditions as necessary for moral virtues, such as generosity, which must be expressed in virtuous action (X.8). However, happiness for Aristotle does not consist primarily in moral but in intellectual virtue, or contemplation. Thus he can say of the "happy man" that he "will have the attribute of permanence" and "will remain happy throughout his life," even in adversity (1.10.1100b), and even though some minimum external goods are necessary for "supreme" happiness (1.10.1100b, X.8.1178b). It is true that Aristotle is a moral elitist in that he understands certain classes of humans (including women and slaves) to be incapable of genuine virtue. However, the limitation on the extension of happiness is not imposed by any intrinsic limitation of its quantity, as it would be for a utilitarian, but by the limited capacities of its potential cultivators (tr. that, for the same reason, certain rules of social practice do not admit of exceptions on the basis of expediency. However, the bottom line in a utilitarian theory of morality is the sum total of welfare, conceived in a relatively immediate, empirical, and quantifiable sense. This is the case even in the more refined "ideal Utilitarianism" described, for instance, by W. D. Ross as a theory in which "the supreme end is to secure, both for oneself and for others, a life which includes in it both good activity and pleasure."
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It is arguable that the watershed of all contemporary moral theory has been the clash between the views of Bentham and Mill, and those of their predecessor Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). As Aristotle is to teleology, so Kant is to deontology its paradigmatic philosophical representative.
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Kant maintained that the essence of moral obligation is the conformity of will to duty for duty's sake, not for that of any anticipated good or bad results. The only legitimate moral principle is one which universally is binding on all rational beings, and it can in no circumstances be set aside prudentially. Kant's theory embodies equality, fairness, and respect for persons which are rationally articulated as the categorical imperative and elaborated via three interpretative maxims.
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In 1958 G. E. M. Anscombe introduced the now disputed term "consequentialism" in an essay in which she querulously yet incisively criticized Kant on the one hand, and Bentham and Mill on the other.
14 While the former fails to stipulate how and at what level of specificity to formulate the moral rule to be universalized, the latter fail to stipulate the nature of pleasure. Thus all leave key notions undefined. Anscombe proceeds to argue that "modern moral philosophy" fails similarly to stipulate exactly what is meant by "ought" and "must" in the moral sense. Instead, the divine-law conception of ethics associated with Christianity is permitted to fill in. According to the Hebrew-Christian ethic, certain things are forbidden "whatever consequences threaten." However, since belief in God is no longer explicitly required as a premise for philosophical ethics, and is in fact repudiated by many, moral philosophy has lost its root, and with it any sensible justification for absolute, nonconsequentialist prohibitions. Anscombe thus concludes that the modern philosophical scene since Sidgwick has been overshadowed by 11 Foundations of Ethics 4. 12 See Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1977), in which the intriguing suggestion is made that both Kant and Aquinas are teleologists and that all human action is teleological in that it is purposive. Some of the ends of action are brought into being by it, while others (persons as "ends in themselves") are respected by it. Cf. esp. 288. 13 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Kant offers three forms of the categorical imperative as unconditional; they are the formulas of the Law of Nature, of the End in Itself, and of the Kingdom of Ends.
14 "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33 (1958) 1-19. "consequentialism." This "shallow philosophy" judges moral acts by consequences alone, and evaluates consequences simply by "the standards current in his [the philosopher's] society or circle." As a refutation, Anscombe claims that the act of "judicially punishing a man for what he is clearly understood not to have done" is an act which is "intrinsically unjust," despite the fact that some philosophers (consequentialists) are willing to discuss whether it might in some circumstances be "morally right." Anscombe concludes by noting pessimistically that there is a huge but unfillable "gap" in moral theory which calls for "an account of human nature" and of "human 'flourishing'" such as that which seems to be presupposed, if not made fully explicit, by Plato and Aristotle. Acts inconsistent with such a nature, or such flourishing, were they adequately defined, might be prohibited unconditionally and nonconsequentially.
In subsequent literature, "utilitarianism" (in the classical sense of "the greatest good for the greatest number") and "consequentialism" have been taken as synonyms. 15 Additionally, utilitarianism has been viewed by many as comprising most if not all teleology, or at least "pure" teleology. I shall argue that this is a misrepresentation of teleology. In addition, it may be possible to define consequentialism more broadly, though whether this is advisable given the genesis and generally accepted meaning of the term remains in question.
TELEOLOGICAL GROUNDINGS OF NORMS AND EXCEPTIONS
Interest in teleology and utilitarianism in the theological community has received impetus in the last two decades from discussion of the justification and function of moral norms. The project of re-examination was begun by several Continental theologians in the 60's and early 70's (Peter Knauer, Louis Janssens, Ernst Fuchs, Bruno Schiiller, and others). The work of Richard McCormick has built upon that of his colleagues. His early exploratory synthesis, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, has provoked much of the subsequent discussion. 16 Broadly speaking, these 15 Anscombe herself distinguishes consequentialism from utilitarianism by claiming that the latter at least allows a difference in the moral character of acts whose good or bad effects are unintended or merely foreseen, as opposed to directly intended, while consequentialism does not. Thus consequentialism seems to be a less subtle and more crude theory of maximizing good results. 16 authors represent a shift from a stress on absolute norms forbidding specifically defined physical acts to a perspective more appreciative of the relevance of individual circumstances both to actual agency and to the formulation of moral norms. At the center of the discussion has been the principle of "double effect." This principle has roots in Thomas Aquinas, 17 but it came to real prominence in Catholic moral thought in the nineteenth century. 18 The principle has been a staple in the modern manuals, which approach moral dilemmas systematically and topically, on the basis of a few key principles proposed at the outset. Double effect envisages moral dilemmas in which the best outcome concretely possible can be realized only by an action which will be accompanied by some undesirable results. The principle, first, allows that it may be morally justifiable to cause some bad effects in pursuing the good, and, second, sets limiting conditions on the evils which it is permissible to tolerate. The principle can be understood in terms of a commitment to take consequences seriously into account in moral judgment, while simultaneously drawing the line at utilitarianism. According to the standard account of its meaning, the principle justifies the double causation of good and evil only if the action having the two results is not one of a class of "intrinsically evil" acts, which are absolutely forbidden as moral evils or sins; if the good result outweighs or is equal to the evil one; if the evil effect is not wanted for its own sake but is only tolerated as the price of the good (is "indirectly intended"); and if the evil effect is not itself the means of producing the good. To cite a classic application, a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman would be justified if she had cancer of the uterus. First, hysterectomies are undesirable mutilating procedures, taken in themselves, but not forbidden; they may be justified by proportionately serious medical considerations. Second, saving maternal life is a good which can balance or override the evil effect of causing fetal death (and removing the reproductive organs). Clearly, the death of the fetus is not wanted in itself (as it would be in a "direct" abortion) but is a "necessary evil." Finally, the death of the fetus is not itself the means of curing the mother. In a case in which it were necessary to attack directly the life of the fetus in order to save its mother (say, in the case of renal failure or heart disease during pregnancy, or an obstructed labor), such a lifesaving procedure would not be justified by the principle of double effect. There are limits to the evil justifiably to be done in quest of the good.
Buy why precisely these limits? This is the question pressed by commentators and would-be revisore of the principle. The exchanges have been long, complicated, and sometimes defensive. The two primary targets of inquiry have been the initial category of "intrinsically evil acts," and the requirement that the evil effect not be the means of producing the good. It is no simple matter to summarize this discussion succinctly and clearly; I will risk oversimplification as the evil attending my attempts to do so.
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Bruno Schüller accounts for the form and sense of the principle of double effect by describing it as a way to limit the force of absolute, deontologically grounded norms in Catholic ethics. Schüller thinks that absolute prohibitions in traditional Catholic theology are strongly deontological in nature; that is, they specify "actions whose moral quality is completely independent of their consequences." 20 These deontological norms are of two kinds. An action is illicit either because it frustrates a God-given natural faculty (contraception interferes with procreation) or because the agent lacks the appropriate authority (killing the innocent or suicide violates God's dominion over life, while necessary capital punishment belongs to the God-given charge of the civil authority). According to Schüller, the principle of double effect "serves precisely the purpose of a restrictive interpretation of deontological norms." 21 In other words, the evil effects allowed by the principle are exactly the outcomes prohibited by the norms "absolutely" understood. The principle mitigates the force of the norms in conflict situations where the consequences of obedience to them seem to fly in the face of moral common sense. The evil effects in question may not be directly intended and caused, but they need not be avoided absolutely; they may be foreseen, permitted, and tolerated. Thus, according to Schüller, the deontological norms are subject to teleological modification. This analysis leads to the question whether Catholic natural-law moral thinking can be explained only by conceiving it as a hybrid of deontological and teleological modes of discourse. Another way to put the issue would be to ask whether absolute norms can be derived in a basically teleological system. Schüller himself remarks that the grounding of 19 More than one author has had occasion to adduce the observation of Schüller that while the principle of double effect is relatively easy to apply, it is notoriously difficult to explain ("The Double Effect in Catholic Thought: A Réévaluation," in Doing Evil to Achieve Good 169). Scholarly attempts to do so often mirror in style the convolution of the principle's conditions. 20 22 In the end, even norms argued on the basis of divine authority may be susceptible to teleological justification, e.g., suicide interferes with one's duty to perserve oneself in purposive service to God and fellows.
In the end, then, it remains dubious that all absolute norms must be established deontologically. Speaking teleologically, one might construe moral absolutes as assertions that certain sorts of actions are unexceptionably inconsistent with the telos of human life, however that may be defined. Although some norms in Catholic moral theology appear to function deontologically, in that they do not admit exceptions for considerations of expediency, or even of long-range consequences, they are grounded in a teleological construction of moral agency.
McCormick grasps the principle from the same natural-law tradition as does Schüller, but interprets it in completely teleological terms. He observes instructively that the key to the principle is "proportionate reason," 23 or what Knauer calls also "commensurate reason." 24 This has important consequences for the original limiting conditions of the principle. In a case in which the good outweighs evil, the intention obviously is directed at the former rather than the latter, so the requirement of indirect intention becomes superfluous. 25 As long as the reason is proportionate, it also is unnecessary to avoid using the evil result as a means to the good (as in direct abortion). Finally, the category of intrinsic evil is itself questionable; it implies that there are some physical acts which are precluded from the estimate of proportion, quite apart from any consideration of circumstances, motives, and purposes. But what exactly are these acts, and by what process are they to be named? Standard lists include, e.g., "blasphemy, perjury, masturbation, and murder." act such as masturbation would seem to be in a category other than the remaining terms; it denotes a physical act without indicating the situation in which it is performed. The other terms are so-called "value terms," that is, they indicate not only a physical act (speaking the name of God, lying, and killing) but also a pejorative value judgment, based on the assumption of accompanying situations of which a good, (proportionate) cause for the act is not a part. Several authors recently have raised the question thus: How can a physical act like masturbation or contraception be prohibited absolutely, even granting that it is a disvalue, i.e., something to be avoided all other things being equal, that is, in the absence of proportionate reason? Would circumstances, e.g., masturbation for a semen test, contraception to safeguard a woman's health, make no difference? Is masturbation "intrinsically" more evil than other acts, such as killing a human being, which can be justified in extreme circumstances?
As a result of this line of questioning, a distinction has developed between "physical," "ontic," "nonmoral," or "premoral" evil, and "moral" evil or sin.
27 Physical or premoral evils may be caused directly for a good reason, although moral evils may not. The only absolute norms are thus those regarding moral evil, but these necessarily are either abstract or stipulate a specific disproportion in act and circumstances. Essentially, they affirm that it is always wrong to cause a nonmoral evil for a frivolous or inadequate reason. A nonmoral evil (death, pain, error) perpetrated disproportionately is a sin. Examples of absolute norms forbidding moral evils abstractly would be "never act unjustly" or "dishonestly" or "unlovingly." But what constitutes the just, honest, or loving act in the concrete depends upon circumstances for its determination. The upshot of this particular revisionist move is that the category upon which the first condition of double effect is contingent disappears. Or at least it comprises only, first, prohibitions at a level of abstraction which makes them unhelpful for particular moral judgments, and, second, prohibitions of acts in certain stipulated circumstances in which lack of proportionate reason is a question already settled. There are no intrinsically evil acts if by "acts" is meant physical acts considered in the abstract (contraception, masturbation). In sum, the function of norms is to determine the relation of values in the objective scale of values (ordo bonorum). This order is presupposed by the natural-law commitment to an objective moral order, knowable at least in principle by reasonable reflection on the essence of the human. But norms regarding physical acts are meaningful only if they relate the value or disvalue of the act in question to another value on the scale.
In the Catholic Thomistic natural-law view, the purpose of all human activity is to realize values in an ascending scale, and in doing so, to fulfil human nature or what McCormick refers to with Anscombe as "human flourishing." 28 In the Christian theological perspective which informs this ethical theory, to actualize human nature through concrete conformity to the ordo bonorum is to follow the will of the Creator, and in so doing, to approach the summum bonum, God, the origin and final telos of all finite values. Thus the derivative natural-law ethics is thoroughly teleological. This description applies to the principle of double effect, which not only contemplates the immediate consequences of acts but also evaluates their relation to moral values and to the union of all persons in God as the universal common good. Good results, even for a majority, cannot be purchased by the sacrifice of moral values, that is, by acts inconsistent with this final telos. In this sort of teleological perspective, prohibitions which are both exceptionless and specific do not vanish but must include within themselves the naming of values in a disproportionate relation, e.g., "It is wrong to abort a fetus to avoid social embarassment," or "It is wrong to judicially 'frame' an innocent person to avoid social disorder," or "It is wrong to kill noncombatants in order to end a war sooner." The hard task of ethics will be to show why certain values (civilian lives) outweigh others (a larger number of combatant lives), if the calculation is not done by raw numbers, by empirical quantification, or by any of the more crude forms of consequentialism. McCormick's theological tradition and those who do not, and from moral philosophers.
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John Connery's commentary on several authors (not including McCormick) is representative of some of the more careful criticism of this sort. He probes the bases of moral judgments, explaining revisionist Catholic ethics as manifesting "a certain dissatisfaction with the 'deontological' response of traditional Catholic morality and an interest in a more 'teleologica!' approach." In the latter view, morality is entirely dependent on consequences, an approach which Connery insists "is commonly referred to as utilitarianism." Connery allows that it would be difficult to prove that any particular rule is closed to future exceptions, but argues that the problem with consequentialism is that it seems to admit exceptions contrary to commonly held moral convictions (judicial murder). In other words, "a commensurate good will justify any evil connected with the act." 31 Frederick Carney maintains that the utilitarian calculus is "at the heart of" McCormick's teleological method, as focused on the ordo bonorum or scale in which values are to be weighed; the theory is "unquestionably a form of utüitarianism." 32 Germain Grisez, explicitly replying to Ambiguity, defines "consequentialism" as holding that duty is a function of human happiness, and as proposing that the key to the definition of right and wrong is "efficiency in promoting measurable good results. philosopher who has devoted considerable attention to methods and models of ethics, concludes that "I see no alternative but to interpret McCormick as a utilitarian of some sort.., .
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Such criticisms raise problems for the perspective of McCormick (and others) as teleological and as Christian. First, I will indicate some of the reasons why the theory tends to take on a utilitarian appearance in the eyes of some beholders; then I will indicate some of McCormick's at tempts at a rejoinder; finally, I will try to outline those defining charac teristics of Christian consequentialist teleology which distance it from utilitarianism. The factors provoking the conclusion appear to include at least three, though they are not equally influential in the work of each commentator.
First, there is a confusion between premoral and moral evil. This confusion sometimes is due to the fact that McCormick is taken to be arguing that good consequences justify a morally evil or sinful act. This is rejected on the premise that "a good end does not justify an evil means." For example, William May asserts that the calculator of propor tion is willing to be an "evildoer."
36 Paul Ramsey is resistant to McCormick's inclusion of killing among premoral evils, maintaining instead that it is something never to be done directly. He asks: "what argument can there be for classifying the killing of one person by another as a nonmoral evil? Doubtless it is sensible to call death a nonmoral evil. But at issue is the moral evil of killing a human being; he is the image of God and is holy ground." 37 Ramsey concludes that there is "really not much sense" in the "bifurcation of the moral universe" into moral and nonmoral or physical values and acts.
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In such cases there is a lack of appreciation of McCormick's points that premoral evil is not morally "neutral" but is something to be avoided in general, and that moral evil consists in choosing a nonmoral evil without sufficient cause. An evil like killing is pot a "moral" evil because its direct causation is not to be avoided at all costs and absolutely. and moral evil goes beyond mere misunderstanding of definitions to real difficulty in drawing the line between the two. In order to indicate precisely when a premoral act becomes a moral one, it is necessary to differentiate from its accompanying circumstances the purely "ontic" or "material" act, often but not always identified as a "physical" act. If an ostensible definition of an "at. m itself' really includes certain contingent conditions under which the act is performed, then a value relation and therefore a moral judgment are implicit in the description. It is no longer a simple naming of an act, but a value term. One of the more obvious examples is the term "murder," which not only means the physical act of causing a human being's death but also posits circumstances which do not justify that act. But it is sometimes more difficult to draw a line between the sheerly "physical" act and extenuating circumstances. For instance, "killing an innocent person," on the face of it less loaded than "murder," is not a physical description in the pure sense because it extends beyond "killing a human" to define the circumstance of "innocence." Thus it too may be a value term (or phrase). This difficulty in sufficiently narrowing definitions of acts so that they can be considered "in themselves" is evident in the criticisms which The importance in provoking his critics of McCormick's own utilitarian-sounding exposition via specific examples in Ambiguity cannot be overlooked. In subsequent work, however, he has indicated that longterm consequences which are of great magnitude in a quantitative sense do not justify a temporally or numerically more limited violation of a higher or even equal value (e.g., "judicial murder" or bombing noncombatants). A third perceived flaw is the severance of moral evaluation from the firm foundation of moral absolutes. Connery, for one, is convinced that the theory of proportion calls for a continual weighing of goods too complicated for a "healthy" moral life. 42 Absolute norms simplify matters morally and improve the clarity and even the accessibility of the path to virtue.
It is important to reiterate that while the revisionist theory rejects as incoherent the notion of the intrinsically evil act upon which traditional absolutes were based, it does preserve absolute norms which are specific in their denotation of value relations. In the proportionalist interpretation of moral norms, the unconditional force of a moral rule depends on specification of circumstances adequate to constitute a disproportion between the end sought and the value sacrificed, not on the abstract naming of a material act. Norms are exception-excluding in proportion to their specificity regarding values in conflict. The intrinsically evil acts which are, it is objected, occasionally justified (masturbation) are those not described with enough specificity to constitute a truly exceptionless norm. Those which are described with specificity are those reclassified as "value terms," and their binding force is not denied. Since moral values (honesty, justice, etc.) may never be overridden (in that they can never genuinely conflict with one another), the norms which refer to them can be absolute, even while necessarily abstract. Instead of stipulating a conflict, these absolute norms are premised simply upon the fact that there can be no conflict.
One pertinent and undeniable shortcoming in McCormick's sort of innovative teleology is that, in the absence of a classical or medieval metaphysics and anthropology, it is no mean task to discern and agree upon the precise relations of values in the hierarchy upon which the theory depends. Herein lies the force of Connery's critique. It is possible to enjoin or to prohibit absolutely certain resolutions of value conflicts only in the light of knowledge of the ways in which such resolutions impinge on human nature. This is why the achievement of some consensus on the hierarchical relations of potentially conflicting values (e.g., premoral values), while so elusive, is so vital. Probing these relations is where lies the substantive task of the moral philosopher and theologian.
In regard to the ability of the average agent to make decisions faithful to the order constituted by complex relations of goods, it is essential also to note that the theory of proportion does not require that each person approach all decisions via an intricate conceptual schematization of relative values and disvalues. This is the job of the theoretician, but not necessarily of the decision-maker. McCormick refers repeatedly to the "prediscursive" elements of moral judgment, implying that good moral common sense never has been and is not now to be replaced in practice by conceptual analysis, whether the latter be expressed in the form of absolute prohibitions or proportionate value relations. Borrowing a phrase from Karl Rahner, McCormick speaks of a "moral instinct of faith," which not only "cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection" but is also "chiefly responsible for one's ultimate judgments in concrete moral questions." 43 The truth of this observation, however, does not dispense the ethicist from the responsibility to probe unceasingly toward conceptual clarification of the warrants for normative moral judgments. Until this is accomplished or at least approximated, the gap so deplored by Anscombe remains unbridged.
McCORMICK'S MODIFIED THEORY
In the collection of commentaries on Ambiguity, Doing Evil to Achieve Good, McCormick intends both to retract the quasi-utilitarian arguments of Ambiguity and to develop a framework for the evaluation of acts which are meant to resolve conflicts among the highest human goods. 44 There he allows that while certain "disproportionate" actions may have deleterious social effects, these effects do not constitute their immorality. Rather, there is a lack of proportion in the act itself which makes it wrong. The proportion in the act is perceptible on the basis of a theory of associated basic goods.
Wrongfulness must be attributed to a lack of proportion. By that I mean that the value I am pursuing is being pursued in a way calculated in human judgment (not without prediscursive elements) to undermine it. I would further explain (tentatively) the disproportion in terms of an association of basic goods whereby the manner of protecting or pursuing a good brings other values or goods into play and can be responsible for disproportion as a result. In other words, I would abandon the long-term effects explanation of teleology; but I see no reason for abandoning the teleology itself.
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This proposal has not reached full maturity, but it contains two key elements by which McCormick intends to separate himself from consequentialism in Anscombe's sense. First, there are certain acts which are wrong absolutely, even though these acts can be specified only if some accompanying circumstances are known. McCormick follows traditional moral theology in saying that a disproportion exists whenever the end or good pursued in an act is really undermined or contradicted in a larger 43 sense by the means chosen to seek it here and now. He refers to the perception of the intrinsically disproportionate character of a certain act as a "judgment of counterproductivity." 46 Second, there are certain values in the scale which always prevail in conflict cases, so that to choose against one unless it is "necessary" (in a "deterministic," even physical sense) 47 is by definition "disproportionate." These values are included in the "association of basic goods." Since the values in the association are all equal and interdependent, to choose against one is to violate all the others. Thus, to conclude that an act which aims at one value is disproportionate in itself, it is necessary simply to show that the act damages another value in the group.
The points of unclarity in this clarification are at least two. First, what is added to the theory by the stipulation that "disproportion" means undermining the specific objective of the act (rather than some different but higher value)? In a recent article with which McCormick concurs and on which he comments at length, 48 Peter Knauer elaborates the notion of "counterproductivity."
49 Essentially, Knauer wants to base moral evaluation on a method of assessing nonmoral values which is not utilitarian and which in fact overcomes the split between deontology and teleology. He claims his theory has in common with teleology its foundation of moral imperatives in the goodness of being and with deontology its location of morality in the inner character of the act itself. 50 Knauer observes that what one wills in acting at all is the realization of some good. However, the total moral character of a decision or act consists not merely in the fact that it realizes some specific nonmoral good, but that good is promoted in a universal sense or absolutely ("universal formulierten"), apart from any reference to specific persons or communities of persons for whom it is concretely enhanced ("abgesehen von der Person"). Knauer insists repeatedly that the value sought concretely must be promoted "in the long run and on the whole" ("auf die Dauer und im ganzen"). The rather utilitarian ring of this phrase diminishes when it is understood that the effect of an act on a certain value must be evaluated ill relation to all present and future members of the human race, that is to say, to the whole of reality ("Gesamtwirklichkeit"). 51 An act which fails in this regard is counterproductive and hence intrinsically immoral.
For example, taking property (bank robbery) is done with a commensurate reason if necessary to save one's life. However, it if is done merely to accumulate wealth, then it is wrong because the good pursued in the act (wealth) is sought in a way which undermines the nature of wealth or property itself, and hence also the general conditions of human living.
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Thus the requirement of counterproductivity dissociates the revisionist theory from utilitarian ones by making it unnecessary to calculate the relative worth of discrete goods. 53 The counterproductive action undermines the very value by which the action is motivated.
Knauer likens his theory to Kant's categorical imperative, which entails that moral norms must be universalizable, so that no human person is degraded to a mere means. 54 Knauer offers noncounterproductivity as the criterion of universalizability. Kant himself provides two complementary perspectives on immorality as the doing of that which one is unable to will be done universally. In his analysis of lying in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant argues that to tell a he undermines the presupposition that speech will be taken as true. For this reason the agent who acts in a way that he or she could not will to be a universal law acts inconsistently. In the same way, a counterproductive act such as robbery undermines the very condition of acting and is thus inconsistent in the sense of irrational or internally incoherent.
However of diagnosing disproportion through a familiar symptom. If the place of the sought-for value is falsely represented on the scale, then respect for it ultimately will be damaged. If the value ostensibly actualized is supported via the sacrifice of a higher value, or even by the unnecessary sacrifice of an equal or lower value, then our steady and realistic sensitivity to the worth of the first value itself is liable to be eroded. Knauer himself seems to contemplate this possibility in his remark that when one in realizing one value opts unnecessarily against another, then the harm done falls immediately within the scope of the intention and defines the action as counterproductive, since it is, so to speak, a diminution of the value itself.
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The second question to be pressed toward further precision in McCormick's recent modification is, which values constitute the basic "association" and why? The notion of affiliated coequal basic goods is one which McCormick arrives at primarily through the work of the Oxford philosopher of natural law and natural right, John Finnis; 57 both endeavor to fill out the notion of "human flourishing" suggested by Anscombe. Finnis claims that seven basic forms of human good and well-being are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion, although these also can be stated derivatively in 56 Ibid. 337. McCormick elaborates on Knauer's discussion by explaining that robbery is counterproductive because private property is essential for "the over-all well-being of persons," and "well-being" is after all that at which robbery aims ("Notes on Moral Theology: 1980" 89). Yet, as a gloss on the meaning of counterproductivity, this translates "the value sought in the act" into a notion so global that it can comprehend not only any value sought disproportionately but also any value sacrificed. It amounts simply to a formal definition of immorality ("that which is destructive voluntarily of the well-being of persons"). This is equally evident in McCormick's explanation of the wrong of adultery as counterproductive because it damages "human fulfilment." It would seem more specific and more sensible to say, e.g., that the preservation of life justifies violating private property simply because it is a higher value, which the accumulation of personal wealth is not. Our estimation of life as a good is enhanced rather than endangered by a necessary and thus proper setting aside of a lower value. The question remains, therefore, whether it cannot be said of an act that it is intrinsically disproportionate simply because it sacrifices a good or value without good reason, granting that by implication this redounds negatively upon the value sought. other ways. 58 The basic inclinations mentioned by McCormick are roughly equivalent to these (though not so definitively enumerated), 59 with the addition of "the tendency to mate and raise children." 60 Pro creation is called a basic value by Finnis in an article on sexual morality 61 but is not included in the list in his later volume on natural rights.
The basic goods or values are not in themselves "moral values," but nonmoral goods which appeal to intelligence and will. The moral choice is that which realizes or suppresses the goods on particular occasions of action. The morally right act is the one which maximizes these nonmoral goods to the extent concretely possible. 62 In Finnis' view, these goods are equally fundamental, for each, when focused upon, can be regarded "reasonably" as most important. Since there is no objective priority among them, it is never right to sacrifice one for another or, what amounts to the same thing, to act directly against them. Every act must retain "openness" to each of these values and so "remain open to the ground of all values." 63 The essential truth of Finnis' proposal lies in his perception that at the heart of natural-law theory is a commitment to certain basic goods which in themselves are attractive to human freedom and intelligence and to which human nature inclines. McCormick cer tainly concurs in this insight.
Nonetheless, some further questions may be put to Finnis, and to McCormick regarding his interpretation of Finnis. It will become appar ent that it is far from clear that Finnis and McCormick intend to answer these questions similarly. Some discrepancies may contribute to the uncomfortable position which the "association of basic goods" occupies in McCormick's larger perspective.
In the first place, why is it these particular goods which are associated? McCormick seems to take over his list from Finnis on account of its fundamental compatibility with his own Aristotelian-Thomistic view of natural inclinations. Finnis appeals for the endorsement of his theory to a hypothetical consensus grounded in our common human experience of the "importance" of these values (and not others), rather than through the logical force of any precise criteria for inclusion or exclusion. It is at least arguable that the equal status of these values is not as self-evident as their general fundamentally.
At this point the difficulty noted above in distinguishing a truly nonmoral good from a moral one resurfaces. If it were the case that the 
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Granting that it is possible to speak of a broad teleological ethics which does not exclude all elements generally considered deontological, it will be useful to demonstrate more exactly how modern Catholic natural-law ethics, and the approach of McCormick in particular, can be said to fall within that category. In doing so, the contrast between this sort of teleology and utilitarianism will be clarified. While utilitarian theories give precedence to beneficence over justice, and thus to net social good over individual rights, there are other forms of teleology in which an inviolable dignity of the individual is not seen as incompatible with maximization of the good, but as in fact demanded by it as a condition of its possibility.
One category in Thomistic natural-law ethics which is teleological regards communal welfare, and yet protects the inviolability of the individual is that of the "common good." This concept has roots in the Summa theologiae 68 but has been developed in modern social thought by the nineteenth-and twentieth-century popes in the social encyclicals. Put 
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This is a category of which McCormick makes indirect use in developing his theory of proportion toward a social ethics. Perhaps the clearest and, to some of his critics, the most notorious 70 example is his analysis of the morality of experimentation on incompetent human subjects. He has defended at length the position that nontherapeutic research may be conducted on children and others incapable of consent, if the social need and potential benefit of the research is considerable, if there is little or no risk to the subjects, and if consent is given by proxy. 71 The rationale behind this conclusion is not utilitarian in character; it does not consist in making a case that some "rights" of incompetents may be set aside if the greater welfare of others demands it. Instead, McCormick argues that individuals have social duties, the fulfilment of which is in their "best interests" even if not to their immediate personal gain.
72 Our "flourishing" consists in pursuing the well-being of others as well as our own. In a comment on the general character of morality, McCormick remarks:
It is axiomatic that we are social beings, that we move and literally have our being not as atomized individuals, but as interrelated beings. We exist in relationships and are dead without them. This is not surprising to those who believe that man is created in the image and likeness of God, for the more we know of God, the more we know that he is relation, that his very being is "being in and for another."
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At the same time, the risk that the individual "ought to run" for the welfare of others is "minimal." Acceptable nontherapeutic experimentation on children is that which involves "no discernible risk or undue discomfort." McCormick insists that if acceptable risk is interpreted otherwise, "it opens the door wide to a utilitarian subordination of the 
OVERVIEW
In summary, then, deontology is nothing more and nothing less than a comprehensive view of the moral life, in which moral experience is perceived as obligation or obedience to duty, whether that is defined in terms of the command of God or the imperative of reason. Teleology is a view which models human agency on the pursuit of an appropriate ultimate goal-whether it be happiness or union with all persons in God-and of intermediate goals subsidiary to it. Utilitarianism and consequentialism, as defined by Anscombe, are teleological theories in which the goal of human acts is the pursuit of "the greatest good for the greatest number" or the greatest sum total of social welfare, understood temporally and empirically or at least quantifiably.
The moral theory of Richard McCormick and like-minded colleagues is teleological. Further, the thesis is defensible that it is a nonutilitarian form of teleology, if fully understood. This is despite McCormick's abortive attempts to re-establish exceptionless rules after his discussion of proportion in Ambiguity. The primary difference between the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill and the broad teleology of Aristotle, Aquinas, and McCormick is that the "good" (telos) to be sought is perceived differently. Now, not all utilitarians give precisely the same definition of "happiness," nor do Aristotle, Aquinas, and McCormick give precisely the same meaning to the virtuous or humanly fulfilling life. Yet it is the case that the latter three have common elements in their understanding of the morally good life not shared by the former two and their interpreters.
Put briefly, the utilitarian authors envision a shared social good which is material or so dependent on material conditions that it must be finite in its range of distribution. Thus it is to be anticipated that not all wouldbe participants in t^e net social welfare will be able to partake to the fullest of "happiness." Consequently the utilitarian notion of justice entails no requirement that all have an equal right to essential material, social, and moral gpods included in the telos; nor, far less, does it presuppose that the telos is only constituted fully by the participation of 74 "Proxy Consent" 220-21. all who are oriented to it by nature. It is this presupposition about the character of the good that results in the debate in utilitarian theory over whether the good should be maximized simply, to produce the largest possible sum total, or whether it is better to distribute the limited resource, happiness, among as many participants as possible. This is evident even in John Stuart Mill's claim that there is an affinity between utilitarianism and Christian morality. "To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." The "highest virtue" is to sacrifice one's own happiness for that of others, since happiness cannot in principle be had equally by all. 76 In this order of values, no person, in whom and whom only inhere moral values (honesty, justice, freedom, love-the "absolutes" on the scale in whose realization consists virtue), can be treated as a bonum utile, a means or object to be subordinated to the purposes of others. Every individual is a bonum honestum, an "end in itself" in Kant's sense. This precludes at the very outset minimizing the dignity of some to maximize the welfare of others. Thus, it is absolutely forbidden to lead another into sin, or to act oneself unjustly or unlovingly in any concrete act. The remaining task of ethics 75 John Stuart Mill (n. 10 above) 217-18.
76 "Proxy Consent" 217.
is to determine further which concrete acts in which circumstances do indeed respect and actualize moral values and, concomitantly, respect the dignity of persons. To conclude, a utilitarian ethics does consider equality, all other things being equal, and in the sense that the happiness of each counts equally; but it permits equality to be set aside for considerations of utility. It also presupposes that happiness is both quantifiable and limited, so that participation in the good is by definition not universal. The happiness sought is temporal, historical, and finite, even if the candidates for a share are numbered in a pool which is "cosmic" and "inclusive of all sentient creatures past and present" (Mill and Sidgwick).
In Aristotelian or Christian teleology of a broad sort, each person has inviolable dignity and thus equality. Some deontologists like Frankena would argue that equality must be premised on a principle of justice distinct from that of beneficence. However, if "doing good" is taken in the comprehensive teleological sense and not in the narrow utilitarian one, then considerations of fairness and respect for persons may also be included. Further, the telos to be pursued (not necessarily produced) is not to be understood most basically as material or finite, but rather as unlimited. In religious teleologies this telos is not only ultimately nonquantifiable but also transcendent, since it is identified with God, or union of persons in God as the "universal common good." 
